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1RWKLQJ´²the Legal Profession and 
the Disproportionate Burden of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
Sarah Kebbell* 
University of Sheffield 
EU law; Legal profession; Money laundering; Practice management; Risk 
management; Suspicious activity reports 
This article argues that the failure to exclude minor offences and regulatory 
breaches from the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 creates a disproportionate burden 
on the legal profession. It utilises empirical evidence from 40 interviews with legal 
professionals at Top 50 UK law firms to support this view. 
 
Introduction 
June 2017 saw the transposition of the Fourth Money Laundering Directive (4MLD) 
into UK law, and with it an array of changes that seek to embed further a risk-based 
approach to anti-money laundering (AML).1 During this period of change, the UK 
KDVHOHFWHGWRUHWDLQDQ³DOOFULPHV´DSSURDFKWR$0/LQWKH3URFHHGVRI&ULPH 
Act 2002 (POCA 2002). This approach, which is explored below, creates an overly 
burdensome regime within which the legal profession must operate. This article 
will draw upon empirical evidence from 40 interviews with transactional and 
compliance professionals at Top 50 UK law firms. Based upon this evidence, it 
will argue that the failure to exclude minor offences and regulatory breaches from 
the ambit of POCA 2002 during the transposition of 4MLD is a wasted opportunity 
to address that disproportionate burden imposed on the legal profession. 
 
Background 
+LVWRULFDOO\WKH8.KDVHOHFWHGWR³JROGSODWH´LWV$0/UHJLme and transposed 
the Third EU Money Laundering Directive (3MLD) into UK law in a manner 
which went further than the strict requirements of the Directive.2 Hence POCA 
* 
My thanks to Dr Jennifer Sigafoos, Dr Robert Stokes and Professor David Whyte. 
1 Council Directive 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation 648/2012 and repealing Directive 2005/60 and Commission 
Directive 2006/70 [2015] OJ L141/73. 4MLD is transposed into national law by way of the Money Laundering, 
Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/692). See also the 
Criminal Finances Act 2017 for further AML measures. 
2Council Directive 2005/60 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
and terrorist financing [2005] OJ L309/15. This was transposed into UK law by way of the Money Laundering 
Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/2157) and the Terrorism Act 2000 and Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Amendment) 
Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/3398). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FULPLQDOLVHVGHDOLQJVZLWK³FULPLQDOSURSHUW\´DGHILQLWLRQVRZLGHO\FDVW 
that it encompasses all FULPHVDQGH[WHQGVWRDQ\GLUHFWRULQGLUHFW³EHQHILW´ 
derived from criminal conduct.3 7KHFRQFHSWRI³EHQHILW´DGGVDIXUWKHUOD\HURI 
complexity to the Act as the term includes any notional saving made pursuant to 
FULPLQDOFRQGXFWLQDGGLWLRQWRWKHPRUHFODVVLFDOFRQFHSWVRI³SURSHUW\´DQG 
³SHFXQLDU\DGYDQWDJH´4 The raWLRQDOHEHKLQGWKHDGRSWLRQRIDQ³DOOFULPHV´ 
approach is a purely practical one: it does not require any assessment to be made 
as to the seriousness or otherwise of any underlying criminal offence.5 
The effect this drafting has in practice is that it imposes a disproportionate 
burden upon the legal profession. An array of minor offences and regulatory 
EUHDFKHVZLWKFULPLQDOVDQFWLRQVDWWDFKHGWRWKHPUHIHUUHGWRDV³WHFKQLFDO´ 
offences throughout this article) may trigger a substantive money laundering 
offence under POCA 2002.6 Examples often cited by the profession are the failure 
to comply with a tree preservation order, or to obtain an asbestos-related 
environmental licence, both of which will constitute predicate offences under the 
Act.7 Such offences may come to light when effecting transactional work on behalf 
of a client. Any notional saving made by an offender due to their failure to obtain 
DQHQYLURQPHQWDOOLFHQFHIRUH[DPSOHZLOOWKHQFRQVWLWXWH³FULPLQDOSURSHUW\´,Q 
respect of such criminal property the law firm must make a Suspicious Activity 
Report (SAR) to the National Crime Agency (NCA), and/or seek consent to 
FRQWLQXHZLWKWKHUHOHYDQWWUDQVDFWLRQRQWKHEDVLVWKDWVXFK³DXWKRULVHGGLVFORVXUH´ 
XQGHUWKH³FRQVHQWUHJLPH´LVDFRPSOHWHGHIHQce to the substantive money 
laundering offences.8 
In terms of reporting levels, solicitors submitted 3,461 SARs in 2014±15, 
(constituting under 1% of all SARs submitted to the NCA), although concerns 
have been raised by the NCA and the SRA over declining numbers of SARs from 
the sector in recent years.9 The NCA has not published a more detailed breakdown 
of SARs from the sector, and so it is not possible to identify whether specific 
sections of the profession predominate in terms of the number of reports they make. 
7KHPDMRULW\RIOHJDOVHFWRU6$5VDUH³FRQVHQW´6$5VKRZHYHUDQG 
 
 
3 32&$VSURYLGHVWKDW³3URSHUW\LVFULPLQDOSURSHUW\LIDLWFRQVWLWXWHVDSHUVRQ¶VEHQHILWIURP 
criminal conduct or it represents such a benefit (in whole or part and whether directly or indirectly), and (b) the alleged 
RIIHQGHUNQRZVRUVXVSHFWVWKDWLWFRQVWLWXWHVRUUHSUHVHQWVVXFKDEHQHILW´2QO\DGHSRVLWWDNLQJLQVWLWXWLRQPD\ 
avail itself of a de minimis threshold of £250 (s.339A) pursuant to ss.327(2C), 328(5) and 329(2C). 
4 
)RUWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³SURSHUW\´VHH32&$V3HFXQLDU\DGYDQWDJHLVQRWH[SUHVVO\GHILQHGEXWLV 
referred to in ss.340(6) and (7) of the Act. 
5 This rationale is explained in Secretary of State for the Home Department, Money Laundering and the Financing 
of Terrorism: the Government Reply to the nineteenth Report from the House of Lords European Union Committee 
Session 2008±09, HL Paper 132 (TSO, 2009), Cm.7718, pp.11±12. Hence a bank clerk, for example, would not be 
in a position to distinguish between differing categories of crimes. 
6 6XFKPLQRURIIHQFHVDQGUHJXODWRU\EUHDFKHVDUHW\SLFDOO\UHIHUUHGWRE\SDUWLFLSDQWVDV³WHFKQLFDO´EUHDFKHVLQ 
that they trigger the requirement to make a notification to the NCA, whilst not being perceived by such participants 
as posing a concrete risk of money laundering. 
7See provisions under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and Town and Country Planning (Tree Preservation) 
(England) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/605) in relation to tree preservation orders. See also Davey [2013] EWCA Crim 
1662; [2014] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 34 (p.205), where a confiscation order under POCA 2002 had been granted in an 
amount of £50,000. This sum reflected the increased property value resulting from the felling of a tree protected by 
a tree preservation order. For asbestos related offences see, inter alia, Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. 
8 
For reporting obligations and authorised disclosure provisions see POCA 2002 ss.330±332, 327(2)(a), 328(2)(a) 
DQGD6LQFH-XQHFRQVHQWUHTXHVWVKDYHEHHQUHIHUUHGWRDV³UHTXHVWVIRUDGHIHQFHWRDPRQH\ODXQGHULQJ  
RIIHQFH´VHH1&$³5HTXHVWLQJDGHIHQFHIURPWKH1&$XQGHU32&$DQG7$&7´1&$http://www 
.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/713-requesting-a-defence-under-poca-tact/file [Accessed 30 July 2017]. 
9 
SRA, Anti-Money Laundering Report (SRA, 2016), p.32, http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports.page#aml 
[Accessed 30 July 2017]. 
 
 
  
this may suggest that such reports DUHPRUHOLNHO\WREH³WHFKQLFDO´LQQDWXUHRQ 
WKHEDVLVWKDWODZILUPVDUHVHHNLQJ³FRQVHQW´WRFRQWLQXHZLWKDWUDQVDFWLRQUDWKHU 
than declining to act.10 
This issue has received sustained attention from the Law Society over the years. 
The Society is of WKHYLHZWKDWWKH³GHILQLWLRQRIFULPLQDOSURSHUW\OLHVDWWKHKHDUW 
RIWKHDQRPDOLHVDQGXQLQWHQGHGFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKH8.¶VDQWL-money laundering 
UHJLPH´11 7KH6RFLHW\UDLVHVFRQFHUQVWKDWWKHGHILQLWLRQUHVXOWVLQ³XQHQGLQJ 
WDLQWLQJ´RILQGLYLGXDOVZKHre criminal property tracks through from one transaction 
WRDQRWKHUVXFKWKDW³LWFDQPDNHLWDOPRVWLPSRVVLEOHIRUWKHPWRFRQGXFWWKHLU 
DIIDLUVODZIXOO\DJDLQ´12 It is on this basis that the Law Society has repeatedly 
argued for several amendments to POCA 2002, including the exclusion of minor 
offences and regulatory breaches.13 Such exclusions would not have any effect on 
other sectors obliged to report to the NCA under POCA 2002. For a financial 
institution, for example, money laundering concerns are typically raised in 
connection with the movement of funds through a bank account. In contrast to law 
firms then, such institutions will be unaware of the underlying features of a 
transaction. This means that, even under the existing regime, banks are unable to 
DVVHVVZKHWKHUWKHUHKDYHEHHQDQ\³WHFKQLFDO´EUHDFKHVRQWKHSDUWRIWKHLU 
customers, such as the failure to obtain an environmental licence. 
The multiplicity of consultations during the transposition of 4MLD, together 
with the enactment of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 and the Money Laundering, 
Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 
2017 (MLR 2017) have failed to address this lack of proportionality within the 
$FW7KHUHWHQWLRQRIWKH³DOOFULPHV´DSSURDFK following the transposition of 
4MLD has been influenced in part by the recommendations made by the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), the global AML standard setting body, of which the 
UK is a member.14 One of the measures put forward in the FATF Recommendations 
ZDVWKDWFRXQWULHVVKRXOGFULPLQDOLVHPRQH\ODXQGHULQJLQUHODWLRQWR³DOO 
serious offences, with a view to including the widest range RISUHGLFDWHRIIHQFHV´15 
Nevertheless, whilst 4MLD seeks to align itself with the FATF Recommendations 
2012, its provisions oblige member states to criminalise money laundering in 
 
10 
NCA, Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2015 (NCA, 2015), p.11, http://www.nationalcrimeagency 
.gov.uk/publications/677-sars-annual-report-2015 [Accessed 30 July 2017]. 
11 
/DZ6RFLHW\0RQH\/DXQGHULQJ7DVN)RUFH³/DZ6RFLHW\UHVSRQVHWRWKH6$5V5HJLPH5HYLHZµ&DOOIRU 
,QIRUPDWLRQ¶´7KH/DZ6RFLHW\Shttps://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/consultation-responses 
/documents/mltf-response-sars-call-information/ [Accessed 28 August 2017]. 
12 7KH/DZ6RFLHW\³)LQDQFLDO$FWLRQ7DVNIRUFH&RQVXOWDWLRQ5HVSRQVH5HYLHZLQJWKHVWDQGDUGV² preparing 
IRUWKHWKURXQGRIPXWXDOHYDOXDWLRQV´7KH/DZ6RFLHW\http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services 
/risk-compliance/anti-money-laundering/documents/financial-action-taskforce-consultation-response-2011/, pp.19 
and 22 [Accessed 28 August 2017]. 
13 
/DZ6RFLHW\0RQH\/DXQGHULQJ7DVN)RUFH³/DZ6RFLHW\UHVSRQVHWRWKH6$5V5HJLPH5HYLHZµ&DOOIRU 
,QIRUPDWLRQ¶´S7KH/DZ6RFLHW\DOVRDUJXHIRULDGHILQLWLRQRI³FULPLQDOSURSHUW\´ZKHUHE\SURSHUW\FRQVWLWXWHV  
an asset rather than any notional savings; (ii) for consideration of a de minimis threshold in POCA 2002 applicable 
to the legal profession. 
14 
)$7)³,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WDQGDUGVRQ&RPEDWLQJ0RQH\/DXQGHULQJDQG7KH)LQDQFLQJRI7HUURULVP	3UROLIHUDWLRQ 
² 7KH)$7)5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV´)$7)XSGDWHG-XQHhttp://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications 
/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html [Accessed 30 July 2017]. 
15 
)$7)³,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WDQGDUGVRQ&RPEDWLQJ0RQH\/DXQGHULQJDQG7KH)LQDQFLQJRI7HUURULVP	3UROLIHUDWLRQ 
² 7KH)$7)5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV´5HFRPPHQGDWLRQHPSKDVLVDGGHG 
 
 
The Disproportionate Burden of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 743 
UHVSHFWRI³VHULRXVFULPHV´DQGGRQRWUHTXLUHWKH³DOOFULPHV´DSSURDFKZKLFK 
the UK has adopted.16 
The consent regime also remains intact following the transposition of 4MLD, 
despite proposals to remove it and replace it witKDQ³HQWLW\´UDWKHUWKDQ 
³WUDQVDFWLRQ´EDVHGUHSRUWLQJV\VWHP6XFKDV\VWHPZRXOGUHTXLUH6$5VWREH 
made in respect of organisations and individuals, as opposed to each transaction 
undertaken by them. Nor has the UK acted upon an alternative proposal set forth 
E\WKH/DZ6RFLHW\ZKHUHE\D³WLHUHG´UHSRUWLQJV\VWHPFRXOGDSSO\WRWKHOHJDO 
VHFWRU8QGHUWKLVV\VWHPODZ\HUVZRXOGVLPSO\³JUDGHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH 
6$5VWKH\VXEPLW´17 
 
Empirical research 
This article draws upon responses from 40 semi-structured qualitative interviews 
with money laundering reporting officers (MLROs), deputy MLROs, senior 
compliance personnel and transactional partners drawn from Top 50 commercial 
UK headquartered law firms.18 The interview data was analysed using thematic 
DQDO\VLVDVDPHWKRGRI³LGHQWLI\LQJDQDO\VLQJDQGUHSRUWLQJSDWWHUQVWKHPHV 
ZLWKLQGDWD´19 Analysis of the responses from participants highlights the negative 
effects the expansive scope of POCA 2002 has on the legal profession in practice. 
Whilst it might be assumed that participants would automatically have a negative 
view of the SARs regime on the basis that it creates additional work, nevertheless, 
many participants expressed an active willingness to comply with the AML regime. 
Participants objected to the way in which minor and serious offences were 
WUHDWHGLQWKHVDPHPDQQHU1RWRQO\GRHVPDNLQJQXPHURXV³WHFKQLFDO´6$5V 
result in an inevitable administrative burden for law firms, it may also result in 
the interruption of high value commercial transactions while NCA consent is being 
sought. 
5HVSRQVHVDOVRVXJJHVWWKDWWKH³DOOFULPHV´DSSURDFKGLVFUHGLWVDQGZHDNHQV 
the AML regime in a much broader sense, with participants questioning the 
intelligence value of technical SARs. A focus on technical SARs diverts resources 
away from areas of real money laundering risk. This focus can even foster a division 
EHWZHHQZKDWLVFRQVLGHUHGE\WKHOHJDOSURIHVVLRQDOWREH³UHDO´PRQH\ODXQGHULQJ 
DVVHSDUDWHDQGGLVWLQFWIURP³WHFKQLFDO´ODXQGHULQJ(Dch of these responses from 
participants is more fully explored below. 
16 
6HHSDUDRIWKHSUHDPEOHWR0/'ZKLFKVWDWHVWKDW³8QLRQDFWLRQVKRXOGFRQWLQXHWRWDNHSDUWLFXODUDFFRXQW 
RIWKH)$7)5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV´6HULRXVFULPHVDUHOLVWHGZLWKLQWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³FULPLQDODFWLYLW\´DWDUW 
4MLD. 
17 
Home Office and HM Treasury, Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance, paras 2.7 
DQG6HHDOVR7KH/DZ6RFLHW\³5HVSRQVHRIWKH/DZ6RFLHW\RI(QJODQGDQG:DOHVWRWKHconsultation issued 
by the Home Office and HM Treasury on the Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance ² 
OHJLVODWLYHSURSRVDOV´7KH/DZ6RFLHW\S6HHhttps://www.lawsociety.org.uk/.../consultation-responses/.. 
./aml-ctf-action-plan-legislation [Accessed 28 August 2017]. 
18 
Forty interviews were conducted between 17 November 2015 and 16 June 2016 with participants from 20 Top 
50 UK headquartered law firms as determined by reference to turnover. Top 50 firms were selected as they represent 
a customary grouping within the profession. Twenty participants were drawn from transactional areas of practice at 
SDUWQHUOHYHOWKHLULQWHUYLHZVUHIHUUHGWRDV³7UDQVDFWLRQDO,QWHUYLHZV´7ZHQW\SDUWLFLSDQWVZHUH0/52VGHSXW\ 
MLROs RUWKRVHIXOILOOLQJDVHQLRUFRPSOLDQFHIXQFWLRQWKHLULQWHUYLHZVUHIHUUHGWRDV³&RPSOLDQFH,QWHUYLHZV´  
(WKLFDODSSURYDOZDVREWDLQHGSULRUWRFRQGXFWLQJWKHLQWHUYLHZVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK/LYHUSRRO8QLYHUVLW\¶V3ROLF\ 
on Research Ethics involving Human Participation. 
19 
9%UDXQDQG9&ODUNH³8VLQJWKHPDWLFDQDO\VLVLQSV\FKRORJ\´Qualitative Research in Psychology 
77, 77 and 79. 
 
 
 
 7KHEXUGHQRI32&$RQWKH/HJDO3URIHVVLRQ³(YHU\ERG\¶V 
ORRNLQJDWQRWKLQJ´20 
 
The lack of distinction between minor offences and serious crimes 
Participants reported that, owing to its structure, POCA 2002 had far too broad a 
UHDFKZKLFKKDGWKHHIIHFWRIFUHDWLQJD³FXPEHUVRPHUHJLPH´21 Participants felt 
that the Act was disproportionate in its effect in that minor infractions were dealt 
with in the same way as serious crime, with those minor offences automatically 
escalated into money laundering scenarios merely by virtue of the definition of 
³FULPLQDOSURSHUW\´XQGHUWKH$FW7KLVLQHTXLWDEOHDSSURDFK was highlighted by, 
for example, the participant who commented with regard to such minor infractions, 
³WKURZLQJLQWKRVHRIIHQFHVZLWKYHU\VHULRXVFULPLQDORIIHQFHVLVWKHZURQJ 
DSSURDFK«EHFDXVHWKH\¶UHWU\LQJWRGRYHU\GLIIHUHQWWKLQJV´22 This view, that 
a distinction should be drawn between minor and more serious offences, was 
HFKRHGE\PDQ\SDUWLFLSDQWVUHIOHFWHGE\WKH0/52ZKRDGGHG³LI\RXFRPSDUH 
DPLQRUUHJXODWRU\EUHDFKWROHW¶VVD\DYHU\ODUJHVFDOHIUDXGWKH\DUHYHU\GLIIHUHQW 
in qualiW\TXDQWLW\DQGFKDUDFWHU´23 
Whilst participants may have formed their own, differing, views as to what 
constitutes a serious crime, it should be noted that 3MLD took a broad approach 
to the definition. In addition to predicate offences such as fraud and corruption, 
all offences carrying a prison sentence in excess of one year fall within the 
GHILQLWLRQRI³VHULRXVFULPHV´24 The same broad approach to the definition is 
adopted in 4MLD, with tax offences included as a predicate offence, and both 
DirectiveVDUHXQGHUSLQQHGE\DZLGHGHILQLWLRQRIFULPLQDO³SURSHUW\´25 
The majority of participants expressed the clear view that minor offences and 
regulatory breaches attracting criminal sanctions should be excluded altogether 
from the ambit of the Act, with virtually all participants performing a compliance 
role holding this view. These minor offences and breaches of regulations were 
W\SLFDOO\UHIHUUHGWRE\SDUWLFLSDQWVDV³WHFKQLFDO´EUHDFKHVLQWKDWWKH\WULJJHUWKH 
requirement to make a notification to the NCA, whilst not being perceived by such 
SDUWLFLSDQWVDV³UHDO´PRQH\ODXQGHULQJDGLVWLQFWLRQZKLFKZLOOEHH[SORUHG 
further below. 
'HVSLWHWKH8.*RYHUQPHQWH[SOLFLWO\FKRRVLQJWRDGRSWWKH³DOOFULPHV´ 
approach reflected in the Act, and whilst participants were aware that the legislation 
was drafted in this manner, its effect is so draconian that several participants still 
felt that the inclusion of technical offences represented an unintended consequence 
or by-product of the legislation, encompDVVLQJRIIHQFHVZKLFKWKH$FW³ZDVQHYHU 
GHVLJQHGWRSLFNXS´26 As one transactional partner summarised in respect of 
UHJXODWRU\EUHDFKHV³WKDW¶VQRWZKDW,ZRXOGLPDJLQHWKHOHJLVODWLRQLQWHQGHGWR 
FDWFK´27 
20 Compliance interview 18 dated 8 April 2016. 
21 Compliance Interview 12 dated 26 February 2016. 
22 Compliance Interview 9 dated 15 December 2015. 
23 Compliance Interview 19 dated 24 May 2016. 
24 
)RUWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³VHULRXVFULPHV´VHHDUW0/'7KHVHULRXVFULPHVZKLFKFRPSULVH³FULPLQDODFWLYLW\´ 
are listed in art.3(4) 4MLD. 
25 
)RUWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³SURSHUW\´VHHDUW0/'DQGDUW0/' 
26 Compliance Interview 6 dated 8 December 2015. 
27 
Transactional Interview 13 dated 1 December 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 The administrative burden of technical SARs 
Submitting SARs in respect of technical breaches is both time consuming and 
resource intensive, resulting in an additional administrative burden on law firms. 
$VRQHSDUWLFLSDQWREVHUYHG³WKHDPRXQWRIWLPHWKDWLVVSHQWGHDOLQJZLWKPLQRU 
regulatory RIIHQFHV\RXNQRZ,WKLQNFORXGVHYHU\WKLQJ´28 In practical terms, the 
amount of time and resource spent making a technical report as opposed to a more 
substantive report can be the same, and potentially even greater where the notional 
saving or benefit is difficult to identify and therefore harder to articulate to the 
1&$3DUWLFLSDQWVDOVRVSRNHRIPDNLQJGHIHQVLYHWHFKQLFDOUHSRUWV³FRYHULQJRXU 
EDFNV´LHFRPSO\LQJZLWKWKHWHFKQLFDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKH$FWWRDYRLGOLDELOLW\ 
under the substantive money laundering offences, an enduring issue which has 
been a feature of the AML arena for many years now.29 Such defensive reporting 
FDQEHVHHQDVDQLQHYLWDEOHFRQVHTXHQFHRIFRPELQLQJDQ³DOOFULPHV´$0/ 
approach with criminal sanctions of up to 14 yeDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWXQGHUWKH 
substantive money laundering offences.30 Cumulatively, the submission of multiple 
technical reports across the sector as a whole can result in what one participant 
PHPRUDEO\GHHPHGWREHQRWKLQJPRUHWKDQDODUJHVFDOH³SDSHUSXVKLQJ´H[HUFLVH 
on the part of the profession and the NCA.31 ,QVKRUW³HYHU\ERG\¶VORRNLQJDW 
QRWKLQJ´32 
 
Transactional interruption 
,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHEXUGHQFUHDWHGE\WKH$FWPDNLQJD³WHFKQLFDO´ 
report may also have a more serious and disproportionate commercial impact on 
transactions being effected by law firms. Should a technical breach causing property 
to become criminal for the purposes of POCA 2002 come to light in the course of 
a transaction, a SAR must be submitted to the NCA and consent sought to continue 
ZLWKWKHWUDQVDFWLRQ$VQR³SURKLELWHGDFW´LQUHVSHFWRIZKLFKFRQVHQWLVVRXJKW 
may take place prior to such consent being granted, this may result in the 
commercial transaction being halted.33 It was this concern that was voiced by the 
transactional partner who, whilst fully supporting the aims of POCA 2002, said 
³WKHQRWLRQWKDW\RXKDYHWRVWRSDELOOLRQGHDOIRUDILQH«WRDFWXDOO\ 
halt that transaction is disproportionate and it can also have quite a serious 
FRPPHUFLDOHIIHFW«LI\RX¶UHDFWXDOO\ZRUNLQJWRDVHULRXVFRPPHUFLDO 
GHDGOLQH´34 
In summary, some participants felt that the requirement to make SARs in respect 
RIWHFKQLFDOEUHDFKHVVHUYHVVLPSO\WR³JHQHUDWHIDUPRUHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHGLIILFXOW\ 
and tranVDFWLRQDOLQWHUUXSWLRQWKDQLVMXVWLILHG´IRUODZILUPV35 
28 Compliance Interview 12 dated 26 February 2016. 
29 Compliance Interview 1 dated 17 November 2015. For defensive reporting comments see SRA, Anti-Money 
Laundering Report, p.32. 
30 The substantive offences are set out in POCA 2002 ss.327±329. Criminal sanctions are set out in POCA 2002 
s.334(1). 
31 Compliance Interview 18 dated 8 April 2016. 
32 Compliance Interview 18 dated 8 April 2016. 
33 
POCA 2002 s.336(10). 
34 
Transactional Interview 7 dated 25 November 2015. 
35 Compliance Interview 9 dated 15 December 2015. 
 
 
 
 
The NCA and technical SARs 
)RUWKHLUSDUWWKH1&$ZHUHSHUFHLYHGE\VRPHSDUWLFLSDQWVDVEHLQJ³RYHUZKHOPHG 
E\LVVXHVOLNH«OLVWHGEXLOGLQJFRQVHQW´RUVZDPSHGZLWKD³GHOXJH´RItechnical 
notifications from law firms.36 As one participant noted: 
³,JHWWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH1&$LVGURZQLQJXQGHUWKHZHLJKWRIQRWLILFDWLRQV 
ZKLFKDUHQRWUHDOLQWKHVHQVH\RXNQRZWKH\¶UHVRUWRIWD[RUWKH 
HQYLURQPHQWDORUWKHGDWDSURWHFWLRQRQHV´37 
This perception was amplified by another participant who said of the NCA that, 
³SXUHUHJXODWRU\EUHDFKHVLVQ¶WVRPHWKLQJWKDWWKH\¶UHUHDOO\IRFXVLQJRQ´38 
Whether this perception is accurate or not is unclear. Whilst the NCA have 
expressed concern in recent times over both the decline in quantity and poor quality 
of legal sector SARs, the NCA have made no public comment suggesting any 
chagrin over the potential multitude of technical SARs submitted to them by law 
firms.39 
 
POCA 2002 detracts from the aim of the legislation 
The detrimental effect of POCA 2002 on the legal profession extends further than 
purely administrative inconvenience or transactional interruption. It has a corrosive 
effect on the confidence that the profession have in the AML regime more broadly, 
with many participants forming the view that the inclusion of technical offences 
actually detracted from or did not fulfil the purpose of the Act. Following the 
WUDQVSRVLWLRQRI0/'LQWRQDWLRQDOODZWKH8.KDVHPEUDFHGD³ULVN-EDVHG´ 
approach to AML, the central tenet of which is that resources should be 
appropriately targeted to the areas of greatest money laundering risk. This approach 
LVUHLWHUDWHGLQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V$0/$FWLRQ3ODQSXEOLVKHGLQ$FWLRQ 
Plan 2016) which expressly states: 
³:HH[SHFWWKHEDQNVDQGRWKHUILUPVVXEMHFWWRWKH0RQH\/DXQGHULQJ 
Regulations to take a proportionate approach, focusing their efforts on the 
highest risks, without troubling low risk clients with unnecessary red-WDSH´40 
The inclusion of technical offences within the regime however militates against a 
risk-based approach in practice. Some participants noted that resources were being 
channelled into making technical reports which could be better utilised in addressing 
more serious money laundering concerns. One participant observed 
36Compliance Interview 3 dated 25 November 2015, Compliance Interview 1 dated 17 November 2015, Transactional 
Interview 2 dated 18 November 2015. 
37 Compliance Interview 8 dated 14 December 2015. 
38 Compliance Interview 14 dated 10 March 2016, Compliance Interview 18 dated 8 April 2016. 
39 The concern over the decline in SARs is raised in the National Risk Assessment, see HM Treasury and Home 
Office, UK national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing (HM Treasury and Home Office, 
2015), paras 6.91±6.93. See NCA, Suspicious Activity Reports Annual Report 2014 (NCA, 2015) pp.13, 27 and 28, 
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/suspicious-activity-reports-sars/464-2014-sars-annual-report 
/file [Accessed 10 July 2017], whereby the NCA liaised with the SRA and the Law Society with regard to poor quality 
SARs. 
40 
Home Office and HM Treasury, Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance, p.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
³LW¶VMXVWPXGG\LQJWKHwaters so that people stop concentrating on what we 
VKRXOGUHDOO\EHORRNLQJDWDQGZKDWDFWXDOO\DUHWKHLVVXHVDVRSSRVHGWR« 
UHSRUWLQJRQVRPHERG\QRWKDYLQJFDUULHGRXWDQDVEHVWRVVXUYH\´41 
This concern was echoed by the participant who regretfully noted that: 
³:H¶UHVSHQGLQJDOOWKLVWLPHUHSRUWLQJ²ZHOO\RXNQRZWKHQ\RX¶UHJRLQJ 
to miss or there is a much greater chance that you will miss the bigger stuff 
EHFDXVH\RXNQRZ\RX¶UHQRWEHLQJDEOHWRWDUJHW\RXUUHVRXUFHVWR«WKH 
real areas of risk.´42 
 
This diversion of resources is an issue that was acknowledged by the Government 
LQLWV$FWLRQ3ODQE\VWDWLQJ³WRRPXFKUHVRXUFHDWSUHVHQWLVIRFXVHGRQ 
dealing with regulatory compliance, and too little is focused on tackling financial 
crime ULVN´43 Nevertheless, the 4MLD transposition will do nothing to improve 
the position, and resources will still be channelled into dealing with technical 
SARs. 
 
7KHTXHVWLRQDEOHLQWHOOLJHQFHYDOXHRI³WHFKQLFDO´6$5V 
Concerns were also raised that the more technical SARs submitted to the NCA do 
not have any intelligence value. This was an issue raised by several participants. 
As with many aspects of the AML regime, which remain shrouded in guesswork 
and estimates, it is difficult to establish a clear link between legal sector technical 
SARs in isolation and the prevention of money laundering or the facilitation of 
WKHFRQILVFDWLRQRIFULPLQDOSURSHUW\7KHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶YLHZVRQWKHTXHVWLRQDEOH 
utility of technical SARs supports the view expressed by the Law Society that the 
³DOOFULPHV´DSSURDFKXQGHU32&$VSDZQVDPXOWLWXGHRI6$5VWKH³YDVW 
PDMRULW\EHLQJRIOLPLWHGLQWHOOLJHQFHYDOXH´44 It also reflects the complaints of 
WKHLUPHPEHUVKLSDVWR³UHFHLYLQJPLQLPDOIHHGEDFNIURPWKH6$5VWKH\PDNH´45 
7KLVLVDQLVVXHWKDWKDVEHHQFRQVLGHUHGUHFHQWO\LQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V$FWLRQ3ODQ 
ZKHUHWKH+RPH2IILFHFRQFHGHGWKDW³ZHQHHGUDGLFDOO\PRUHLQIRUPDWLRQ 
to be shared between law enforcement agencies, supervisors, and the private 
VHFWRU´46 There has been some concrete action in this area, and improved 
information sharing procedures amongst the regulated sector and NCA are enacted 
within the Criminal Finances Act 2017.47 
Several participants went further and expressed doubts as to whether making 
technical reports actually achieved their AML purpose in a wider sense, such as 
WKH0/52ZKRVHYLHZRIWKH$FWZDVWKDW³,WKLQNLW¶VORVWSURSRUWLRQDOLW\«LV 
it helping identify and/or stop crime ? - ,GRQ¶WVHHDQ\HYLGHQFHRIWKDWIURPP\ 
SHUVSHFWLYH´48 The cumulative effect of the blanket inclusion of all criminal 
offences within the ambit of the Act has been to diminish the regard for the AML 
41 Compliance Interview 1 dated 17 November 2015. 
42 Compliance Interview 12 dated 26 February 2016 (emphasis added). 
43 
Home Office and HM Treasury, Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance, p.12. 
44 7KH/DZ6RFLHW\0RQH\/DXQGHULQJ7DVN)RUFH³/DZ6RFLHW\UHVSRQVHWRWKH6$5V5HJLPH5HYLHZµ&DOOIRU 
,QIRUPDWLRQ¶´S 
45 The Law SocLHW\0RQH\/DXQGHULQJ7DVN)RUFH³/DZ6RFLHW\UHVSRQVHWRWKH6$5V5HJLPH5HYLHZµ&DOOIRU 
,QIRUPDWLRQ¶´S 
46 
Home Office and HM Treasury, Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance, p.3. 
47 Criminal Finances Act 2017 s.11. 
48 Compliance Interview 8 dated 14 December 2015. 
 
 
 
 
regime held by some members of the profession. Ultimately it has led to POCA 
EHFRPLQJLQWKHYLHZRIRQH0/52³VRGLVFUHGLWHGLQWKHPLQGVRIPRVW 
SHRSOHWKDWLW¶VDFWXDOO\GDPDJLQJWKHUHJLPH´49 
 
³5HDO´YHUVXV³WHFKQLFDO´ODXQGHULQJ 
2QHIXUWKHUHIIHFWRIWKH³DOOFULPHV´DSSURDFKLQWKH$FWLVWKDWPDQ\SDUWLFLSDQWV 
GUHZDFOHDUGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQZKDWWKH\FRQVLGHUHGWREH³WHFKQLFDO´PRQH\ 
ODXQGHULQJDVRSSRVHGWR³UHDO´ODXQGHULQJ7KLVLVUHIlected by the participant 
ZKRUHIHUUHGWRWKH$FWDVD³FUD]\SLHFHRIOHJLVODWLRQZKLFKFDSWXUHVWKLQJVWKDW 
\RXZRXOGQRWRUGLQDULO\WKLQNRIDVPRQH\ODXQGHULQJ´50 The breaches of these 
regulatory types of offence trigger notification requirements under the Act for both 
ODZILUPVDQGWKHLUFOLHQWV3DUWLFLSDQWVIUDPHG³UHDO´PRQH\ODXQGHULQJLQFRQWUDVW 
as having a genuine link to serious organised crime in some manner and posing 
an actual risk to the integrity of the law firm in question or economy at large. 
7KLVVSOLWEHWZHHQ³WHFKQLFDO´DQG³UHDO´ODXQGHULQJLVEHVWLOOXVWUDWHGE\WKH 
SDUWLFLSDQWZKRFDWHJRULVHGULVNVLQWR³DFWXDODQGVLJQLILFDQWDQGUHDOWRWKHZDVWLQJ 
P\WLPH´51 The concern that this binary categorisation may engender in practice 
is that the practitioner may not perceive a particular issue as being subject to a 
reporting obligation under the Act due to its technical nature, or that it may be 
dismissed as too inconsequential to report. This may give rise to the risk of law 
firms not reporting technical breaches at all. This issue of non-reporting was raised 
E\RQHSDUWLFLSDQWZKRVHFRQFHUQZDVWKDWILUPVPD\ZHOOWDNHWKHYLHZWKDW³LW¶V 
MXVWOXGLFURXV´DQGZHQWRQWRVD\ 
³VRWKHQ\RX¶YHJRWD\RXNQRZUHJLPHWKDWLVHYHQPRUe broken because 
VRPHSHRSOHDUHMXVWVD\LQJµZHOOWKDW¶VVWXSLGZK\ZRXOG,UHSRUWDODFNRI 
DQDVEHVWRVVXUYH\"¶´52 
 
Non-compliance with POCA 2002 as an AML firm level risk 
7KHUHDFKRI32&$LVVRJUHDWWKDWEUHDFKHVRILWV³WHFKQLFDO´UHSRUWLQJDQG 
consent provisions may also trigger money laundering offences within law firms 
themselves. Law firms subject to the MLR 2017 will be required to undertake a 
risk assessment in respect of the money laundering threats to their business.53 
Ironically, given the whole purpose of the Act, non-compliance with the technical 
reporting and consent aspects of the Act was identified by some participants as a 
money laundering risk to their firms in its own right, separate and distinct from 
the more traditional external categories of jurisdictional or funding risks. Minor 
breaches by a law firm of customer due diligence procedures provided for under 
the MLR 2017 attract criminal sanctions, thus constituting a predicate offence 
under POCA 2002. As one participant commentHGLQUHODWLRQWR32&$³LW 
49 Compliance Interview 13 dated 10 March 2016. 
50 Compliance Interview 14 dated 10 March 2016. 
51 Compliance Interview 6 dated 8 December 2015. 
52 Compliance Interview 12 dated 26 February 2016. 
53 
0/5UHJ³$relevant person must take appropriate steps to identify and assess the risks of money 
ODXQGHULQJ«WRZKLFKLWVEXVLQHVVLVVXEMHFW´ 
 
 
 
 
 
is so wide-UDQJLQJWKDW«LWLV«GLIILFXOWWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHILUPDVDZKROHLV 
DGKHULQJDOORIWKHWLPH«WRWKHOHWWHURIWKDW«OHJLVODWLRQ´54 
 
32&$³UHPDLQHUV´ 
Despite the groundswell of support, particularly amongst compliance respondents, 
for creating exclusions from POCA 2002, a number of participants still welcomed 
WKH³DOOFULPHV´DSSURDFKDGRSWHGLQWKH UK. In part this was attributable to the 
perceived practical difficulties which would be involved in drawing a distinction 
between minor and more serious offences or, as one MLRO put it, distinguishing 
EHWZHHQ³ELJEDGFULPHDQGUHJXODWRU\RIIHQFHV´55 
In a purely practical context, several participants also felt that a clear cut rigour 
around small compliance matters fostered a broader ethos of good professional 
conduct within a firm.56 7KHYDVWPDMRULW\RISDUWLFLSDQWVZKRVXSSRUWHGWKH³DOO 
FULPHV´DSSroach of POCA 2002 were transactional participants. This predominance 
may be attributable to the fact that their role in the SARs regime is limited to 
PDNLQJDQLQWHUQDO6$5WRWKHLUILUP¶V0/52,WLVWKHUHIRUHRQO\WKHFRPSOLDQFH 
participants who are responsible for the submission of external SARs to the NCA 
in connection with technical breaches. Those SARs submitted in respect of technical 
matters may well be challenging to report, particularly where they require the 
identification of notional savings or benefits. 
6RPHSDUWLFLSDQWVDOVRIHOWWKDWPLQRURIIHQFHVVKRXOGQRWEHDOORZHGWR³VOLS 
WKURXJKWKHQHW´EXWWKDWWKHUHVKRXOGEHVRPHURRPIRUGLVFUHWLRQLQWKHZD\ 
offences are handled thereafter.57 As one transactional partner commented: 
³,WKLQNLW¶V better to have a wider net and then perhaps more discretion within 
that net as opposed to having a smaller net and then just hoping that those 
PLQRURIIHQFHVDUHLQGHHGMXVWPLQRURIIHQFHVRUMXVWUHJXODWRU\WULSV´58 
This instinctive desire to retain an ³DOOFULPHV´DSSURDFKZDVDUWLFXODWHGEHVWE\ 
the transactional partner who observed 
³P\VHQVHLVWKDWWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWUDYHOLQOHJLVODWLRQLQWKLVVSDFHLVQ¶WWR 
PDNHLWHDVLHUDQG,WKLQNSHRSOHZRXOGUDWKHUMXVWOHDYHLWDVTXLWHWRXJK´59 
 
How might exclusions from POCA 2002 be achieved in practice?  
Given the level of support from the legal profession for exclusions from POCA 
2002, some consideration should be given as to how this could be effected in 
practice. Participants themselves suggested various methods by which exclusions 
could be achieved, any of which could fulfil the aim of removing minor offences 
and regulatory breaches from the ambit of the Act. 
54 Compliance Interview 1 dated 17 November 2015. 
55 Compliance Interview 15 dated 10 March 2016, Transactional Interview 12 dated 1 December 2015 and 
Transactional Interview 14 dated 1 December 2015. 
56 
Transactional Interview 10 dated 26 November 2015, Transactional Interview 12 dated 1 December 2015 and 
Transactional Interview 14 dated 1 December 2015. 
57 
Transactional Interview 20 dated 11 March 2016, Compliance Interview 15 dated 10 March 2016. 
58 
Transactional Interview 16 dated 8 December 2015. 
59 
Transactional interview 2 dated 18 November 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Several MLROs and transactional partners suggested inserting a de minimis 
threshold into POCA 2002, a proposal touched upon in the Action Plan 2016, and 
which could be achieved by recasting the interpretation section of the Act (s.340).60 
A de minimis threshold is already a familiar concept within the confines of POCA 
2002. Deposit taking bodies, for example, can avail themselves of a de minimis 
defence to the substantive money laundering offences set out in ss.327±329 when 
operating accounts below a specified threshold amount.61 The same principles 
could be expanded upon to cater for the legal profession. 
Several compliance participants proposed excluding specified offences by 
reference to the length of sentence they attract, which is the approach taken in both 
3MLD and 4MLD.62 This could be achieved by recasting the interpretation section 
of the Act (s.340).63 Despite the drafting challenges surrounding which offences 
should be included or excluded, expressly carving out specified offences from the 
Act was also proposed as a workable way forward.64 In the alternative, and whilst 
DFNQRZOHGJLQJ³LWZRXOGEHDKXJHWDVNWRGRLW´DQRWKHU0/52VXJJHVWHG 
reclassifying minor criminal offences as civil offences.65 This is an approach that 
would be effective in curtailing the notionally criminal predicate offences which 
trigger offences under POCA 2002. 
Whilst attempts to formulate exclusions from POCA 2002 may involve 
administrative or legislative challenges, they are not insurmountable. As one MLRO 
SXWLW³,¶PVXUHLWZRXOGQRWEHEH\RQGWKHZLWRIPDQWRSURGXFHVRPHWKLQJ´66 
Regardless of the mechanical route by which such exclusions could be achieved, 
and in contrast to many other jurisdictions, the UK has not availed itself of the 
opportunity to recast POCA 2002 or use other means to address its disproportionate 
burden upon the legal profession. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has drawn out the many practical challenges faced by legal professionals 
when operating within the broad regime created by POCA 2002, a number of 
ZKLFKZHUHDOVRUDLVHGLQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V$FWLRQ3ODQ67 The regime creates 
DQHHGOHVVDGPLQLVWUDWLYHEXUGHQIRUODZILUPVLQUHODWLRQWR³WHFKQLFDO´6$5V 
with minor infractions also capable of forcing disproportionate transactional 
interruption. 
Practical consequences aside, the breadth of POCA 2002 has led to a number 
of participants perceiving the regime to be either discredited or broken, on the 
basis that it treats serious crime and nominally criminal offences in the same way. 
More troubling still is the fact that making technical SARs serves to divert law 
60Compliance Interview 13 dated 10 March 2016, Compliance Interview 8 dated 14 December 2015, Transactional 
Interview 11 dated 26 November 2015 and Transactional Interview 7 dated 25 November 2015. Home Office and 
HM Treasury, Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance, p.42. 
61 
POCA 2002 ss.327(2C), 328(5) and 329(2C). The current threshold is £250. 
62 Excluding offences by reference to length of sentence is the approach taken in both 3MLD and 4MLD. See the 
GHILQLWLRQRI³VHULRXVFULPHV´DWDUW0/'DQGWKHOLVWRIVHULRXVFULPHVZLWKLQWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³FULPLQDO  
DFWLYLW\´DWDUW0/' 
63 Compliance Interview 14 dated 10 March 2016 and Compliance Interview 6 dated 8 December 2015. 
64 Compliance Interview 6 dated 8 December 2015. 
65 Compliance Interview 3 dated 25 November 2015. 
66 Compliance Interview 8 dated 14 December 2015. 
67 
Home Office and HM Treasury, Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance. 
 
 
 
 
 ILUPUHVRXUFHVDZD\IURPWKRVHDUHDVWKDWSUHVHQWD³UHDO´ULVNRIPRQH\ODXQGHULQJ 
thus detracting from the effectiveness of the regime still further. 
The operation of the UK AML regime has led to the compartmentalisation of 
³UHDO´DQG³WHFKQLFDO´ODXQGHULQJLQWKHPLQGVRIPDQ\SDUWLFLSDQWV7KLVPD\ 
have a negative impact on compliance with the regime in that technical offences 
may remain unreported simply because they are not identified as reportable by the 
legal professional in question or considered too inconsequential to report. The 
failure to identify and report matters which are technically reportable under the 
Act has a further negative effect on the regime overall. 
The desire of participants to remove minor offences and technical breaches from 
the scope of the Act is a desire to address and redress the disproportionate burden 
LPSRVHGXSRQWKHSURIHVVLRQE\YLUWXHRIWKH³DOOFULPHV´DSSURDFKDGRSWHGE\ 
the Act and the attendant potential liability imposed on lawyers for inadvertent 
laundering under ss.327±329. Exclusions from POCA 2002 could be achieved 
using any of the pathways put forward by participants. 
The inclusive approach adopted may not be too surprising however, given the 
8.¶VSUHYLRXVKLVWRU\RI³JROG-platLQJ´SUHYLRXV(8$0/GLUHFWLYHVWUDQVSRVHG 
LQWR8.ODZRUDVRQHSDUWLFLSDQWFRORXUIXOO\SXWLW³ZHGRH[WUDMDPRQWRSDQG 
ODVKLQJVRIH[WUDVRUWRIµWREHVXUHWREHVXUH¶W\SHVWXII´68 The retention of an 
³DOOFULPHV´DSSURDFKPD\KDYHPXFKWRGRZLth what can be expressed as the 
$0/³]HLWJHLVW´5HFHQW\HDUVKDYHVHHQDQLQFUHDVHGVSRWOLJKWRQPRQH\ 
laundering in preparation for the FATF evaluation of the UK in 2018, coupled 
with numerous pledges to tackle money laundering on the part of a panoply of 
high profile figures.69 In the midst of such scrutiny the UK published its first 
National Risk Assessment (NRA) in 2015, which identified the legal sector as a 
³KLJK´ULVNLQWHUPVRIPRQH\ODXQGHULQJDUDWLQJYHKHPHQWO\FRQWHVWHGE\WKH 
profession.70 This combination of factors alone may well have extinguished any 
political will to be seen to relax the AML regime in relation to the legal profession, 
SDUWLFXODUO\LQOLJKWRIWKHVHFWRU¶VUDWLQJLQWKH15$ 
7KH8.¶VXQZDYHULQJGHYRWLRQWRDQ³DOOFULPHV´ approach may also be 
influenced by political considerations at a supra-national level. The effect of Brexit 
is that the UK will stand alone in many respects from 2019 onwards, requiring it 
to seek out strong partnerships and forge new alliances wherever possible. It enters 
this new arena tainted somewhat by a widely held perception that has gained 
traction in recent years: that the UK is, despite its ornate and elaborate regulatory 
regime, the money laundering capital of the world.71 If the NRA was the flesh 
68 
Transactional Interview 4 dated 20 November 2015. 
69 
6HHIRUH[DPSOH3:LQWRXUDQG+6WHZDUW³'DYLG&DPHURQWRLQWURGXFHQHZFRUSRUDWHPRQH\-laundering 
RIIHQFH´The Guardian, 12 May 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/11/david-cameron-corporate 
-money-laundering-offence-anti-corruption-summit [Accessed 30 July 2017]. 
70 
HM Treasury and Home Office, UK national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing, p.12. 
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 wound, Brexit may prove to be the fatal blow in terms of any political will to 
remove technical offences from the ambit of POCA 2002, notwithstanding the 
suggestion by some commentators that the UK may elect to move away from its 
$0/³JROGVWDQGDUG´LQDQDWWHPSWWRDWWUDFWEXVLQHVVWRLWVVKRUHVSRVW-Brexit.72 
For the time being at least, the legal profession looks set to remain overburdened 
by an AML regime which is entirely disproportionate in terms of the money 
laundering risks it is trying to address. 
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